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THE COLLUSION OF LAW AND SCIENCE
IN THE PIRACY OF HUMAN GENES
TINA PIPER

I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in biotechnology over the last decade have created a
demand for biological resources by transnational corporations. The
search for biological resources has primarily focused on acquiring these
resources from indigenous communities and countries of the South.
However, the means by which these biological resources are obtained is
exploitative and often tantamount to theft (or, as it is commonly known,
biopiracy). As a result of communities attempting to prevent this theft
and corporations seeking more international legitimacy for their
"bioprospecting", "bioprospecting contracts" are more frequently being
concluded between governments and corporations. Through the prism
of current events in Iceland, I will demonstrate that bioprospecting
contracts resolve little; they merely rename and reformulate an old crime
into a new shape of exploitation which may be even more insidious than
earlier f01ms of biopiracy. The events in Iceland will illustrate the
problems inherent in encouraging governments to conclude contracts,
and will show that a contract is only as good as the terms negotiated. The
example of Iceland will also highlight the flexible and polymorphous
nature of biopiracy as well as the myriad types of damage it can inflict
on a community. Finally I will discuss how the law, science and
language each play a role in both obscuring international acts of
biopiracy and maintaining existing power inequalities.
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II. THE CONTEJIT OF BIOPIRACY
1. The role of the life industry in the exploitation of genetic
resources.
i Transnational cotporations acquire genetic resources through
various methods
Transnational corporations mine genetic resources (bioprospect) 1
through various intermediaries, called collectors. Collectors are
primarily individuals prospecting for public collections, 2 academic
researchers from universities, or private prospectors or "brokers"
affiliated with a corporation. In addition, private Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) have also mediated between corporations
wishing to bioprospect and the communities possessing resources. 3
Genetic resources are acquired by any means possible. Collectors
often take resources without properly infonning the community, by
securing the "consent" of the peoples from whom they are taking the
resource. The research and commercial purposes of the sample
collection are not explained, therefore this consent is not considered to
be informed by general legal standards. 4

"Bioprospecting" or "biodiversity prospecting" is defined by D.A. Posey & G. Dutfield,
Beyo11d /11/el!ectual Properly, Toward T!uditional Resource Rights for l11dige11ous Peoples
a11d Local Communities (Ottawa: International Research Development Centre, 1996) at 227
[hereinafter Posey] as:
The search for and collection of biological material for commercial purposes. The areas
where prospecting takes place are usually species-rich environment, such as tropical forests
and coral reefs.
2 Both persons contracted by and officials of government funded agencies.
3 Posey, sztpm note 1 at c. 1. However, industry has been exploiting the trusted position of
NGOs in communities. For example, Pharmacogenetics (a supplier of genetic resources to the
life industry) is partially owned by a private, voluntaiy agency called the Pan-American
Development Foundation (PADF). PADF plans to use its contacts with indigenous
communities, developed over 30 years, to obtain access to genetic bioresources. (RAFI
Communique, "Bioprospecting/Biopiracy and Indigenous Peoples", online: RAFI <http://
www.rafi.ca/web/allpub-one.shtml> (date accessed: November 15, 1999) [hereinafter
Bioprospecting/Biopiracy]).
4
Worthy of particular mention here is the U.S. case of 1Woore v. UniJJersity qf Cal(/omia
Board qfRege11/s 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). The California Supreme Comi held that Moore
had a cause of action against his physician who had removed excess spleen and blood samples
1
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zZ The bioprospecting contract: one method efacquiring genetic
resources
A recent trend in the bioprospecting of genetic resources is that
which creates legally enforceable agreements between source
communities5 and bioprospectors. These agreements can be material/
information transfer agreements, licensing agreements and/or
covenants. 6 A material/information transfer agreement provides that in
exchange for biological resources, information and the right to

and used them to develop a highly profitable cell-line. The doctor had breached his fiduciary
duty by not obtaining informed consent, since he had not disclosed his research and
commercial interests in Moore's spleen and blood cells.
An example in the bioprospecting context, involving both academic researchers and falsely
obtained consent is that of the Guaymi. The claim of falsely obtained consent arose from a
research project conducted by Panamanian scientists in collaboration with the U.S. National
Institutes of Health and the Centre for Disease Control. Researchers were interested in the
human T-lymphocyte virus (HTL V) known to be a primary causative agent in human T-cell
leukemia. The Guaymis and other Amerindian peoples are commonly infected with this virus.
The virus was obtained in the following manner, as described by the president of the General
Congress of the Ngobe-Bugle (Guaymi):
Doctors came to the communities of Pan di Ila in small groups and staried to
collect indigenous blood, pretending that the indigenous people were
suffering from a mo1ial disease and that the blood study was necessary to
investigate the malformation or type of disease they suffered. Participants
were given a small pill to compensate for the loss of blood.
The researchers found an unusual strain of the HTL V in a sample from a Guaymi woman
which they applied to patent in 1990 in the U.S. and worldwide. However the patent
application was abandoned after NGOs, such as RAFI and the World Council of Indigenous
People, and the Guaymi people protested, the researchers citing the high cost of the patent
claim. Throughout, the researchers claimed the Guaymi woman had given her "oral informed
consent" even though she was not informed of the potential patent application and subsequent
commercialization. (Posey, supra note I at 26 and 34; RAFI Communique "The Patenting of
Human Genetic Material: Who owns the human genome? Patenting the human cell lines of
indigenous people.", online: RAFI <http://www.rafi.ca/web/allpub-one.shtml> (date
accessed: October 30, 1999). See also N. Roht-Arriaza, "Of Seeds and Shamans: The
Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local
Communities" (1996) 17 Mich. I.Int. L. 919. [hereinafter Seeds and Shamans]).
5 "Source community" is the term used throughout this paper to refer to the community that
supplies genetic resources.
6 Posey, Sllpra note I at 73. See also Seeds a!ld Shama11s, sl!pra note 4; T. Greaves,
i11tellectua! Properly Rights /or 1!1digeno11s Peoples: A Sourcebook (Oklahoma City: Society
for Applied Anthropology, I 994) [hereinafter Greaves]; World Resources Institute,
Biodiversity Prospecting: Usi11g Genetic Resources for Sustai11able De1;e/opme11!.
(Washington: WRI Publications, 1993 ).
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commercialize findings (including the right to obtain patents), 7 source
communities receive a share of royalties, up-front benefits or payments
from a fund. Licensing agreements do not involve a transfer of
possession; rather, source communities negotiate the specific
proprietary rights that a corporation can have over its biological
resources in exchange for a one-time licensing fee. Covenants dictate
principles that parties must adhere to, in addition to the strict
commercial arrangements generally provided for in contracts.
Bioprospecting contracts have been internationally sanctioned by
government agencies such as the U.S. Congressional Research Service, 8
and non-governmental research organizations, such as the World
Resources Institute. 9 Most significantly, however, the Convention on
Biological Diversity10 explicitly endorses bilateral contracts between
government and industry to control prospecting of a country's genetic
resources in the following provisions:
A11ic/e 15

1.

4.

Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural
resources, the authority to determine access to genetic
resources rests with the national governments and is subject
to national legislation.
Access, where granted, shall be on mutually agreed
terms .... 11

7
Often involving the source "communities agreeing to collect, identify, process, resupply
and in some case conduct further research in a laboratory on a supply of samples." (Posey,
supra note 1 at 68).
8
J. Axt, et al., Bio!ech!lo!ogv, llldigenous Peoples a!ld illte!lec!11al Properly Rights
(Congressional Research Service: The Library of Congress, 1993).
9
W. Reid, et al.. BiodiJJersily Prospec!ti1g: Us!i1g Genetic Resources for Sustainable
Dewlopmenl (Washington: WRI/IUCN/UNEP Global Biodiversity Strategy, World
Resources Institute, 1993 ).
10
(1992) 31 I.L.M. 818. Entered into force December 29, 1993, signed by 163 countries
and ratified by 173 countries (UNEP Gen. Distribution Sheet, Convention on Biological
Diversity. November 3, 1999).
11
The important provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity (for the purposes of
this paper) are:
Ari. 2 De/hurio11s
"Ge11elic material' means any material of plant. animal, microbial or
other origin containing functional units of heredity.
"Gene/le resources" means genetic material of actual or potential
value.
Article J. Pni1c1jJ/e
States have ... the sovereign right to exploit their own resources ...
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Bioprospecting contracts are being concluded between transnational
corporations and government actors, 12 however the degree of
proliferation and use of these contracts is unclear because of the
"private" nature of the commercial dealings. 13
The Convention on Biological Diversity14 has enumerated
international standards for bioprospecting contracts. Other documents,
such as the Covenant on /ntellectual, Cultural and Scient{fic
Resources, 15 while not advocating contractual bioprospecting relations,
have developed standards and codes of ethics for bioprospecting
Article J5. Access to Genetic Resources
5. Access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed
consent. ..
6. Each Contracting Paiiy shall endeavour to develop and carry out
scientific research based on genetic resources ... with the full
participation of, and where possible in, such Contracting Parties.
7. Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or
policy measures ... with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable
way the results of research and development and the benefits
arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic
resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources.
Such sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.
Arlie-le 19. Ha11dlillg ofBio!eclmo!ogy a11d Distributio11 oj'its Benefits

I. Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or
policy measures, as appropriate, to provide for the effective
participation in biotechnological research activities by those
Contracting Parties ... which provide the genetic resources for
such research, and where feasible in such Contracting Parties.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take all practicable measures to
promote and advance priority access on a fair and equitable basis
by Contracting Parties, especially developing countries, to the
results and benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon
genetic resources provided by those Contracting Parties. Such
access shall be on mutually agreed terms.
12
The most recent examples of private bioprospecting contracts are summarized in Seeds
and Shama11s, supra note 4 at 958.
13 According to RAFI: "there may be hundreds of bilateral agreements that are shrouded in
relative secrecy and receive no public scrutiny." (Bioprospec!ti1g,/Biopiracy, supra note 3).
14
Also known as the BiodiJJersilF Convention and Conve11tion on
15
Established by the Global Coalition for Biological Diversity (in Posey, supra note I at
175) [hereinafter the Covena111] The Covena11t recognizes several categories of resource that
are worthy of protection and compensation by corporations. These include:
7 - Biogenetic resources that originate (or originated) on indigenous
lands and territories
9 - Classificatory systems of knowledge, such as traditional plant
taxonomies.
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contracts to protect indigenous peoples and local communities and make
them aware of what can be demanded and expected within the
contractual relationship. 16
The following procedural and substantive conclusions can be
drawn about the content of a bioprospecting contract. Procedurally, the
two parties to a bioprospecting contract are the collector and the
industry. The collector, as outlined above, can be a government, private
individual, non-profit organization or for-profit corporation. The
collector will increasingly be government as Article 15 of the
Biodiversity Convention encourages contracts with government and
transnational corporations prefer contracting with governments. 17 The
bioprospecting contract must include provisions governing access to the
bioresources and terms governing the supply, particularly the quality
and availability, of bioresources. 18 The bioprospecting contract must
specify compensation of the collector. Compensation can take the form
of advance payments, payment of a licensing fee, royalty payments
(usually 1-3% of the value of net sales of a product derived from the
16
For a discussion of a model contract see S.R. King, in Greaves, supra note 6. See also
The Contract between the Co/lee/or and the Govemmenl Parties, available from the Third
World Network, online: TWN <http://www.southbound.eom.my/souths/twn/twn.htm> (date
accessed November 15, 1999).
17
Industry also prefers to deal with institutional (i.e. governmental) collectors since
government involvement makes collection more stable, reliable and ultimately more
profitable. Transnational pharmaceuticals have enumerated the following criteria:
[W]hat are the qualities of the ideal collector?
• supervision by qualified scientists and access to taxonomic expertise to
properly identify samples
• sound management and administration
• stable political and economic conditions in the collector's country
• a literate and skilled local population
• assurance that the collector institution will continue to function at least
for the term of the contract
• national and/or international organizations ... possess the expertise and
authority to obtain such materials from whatever source.
S.A. Laird, "Contracts for Biodiversity Prospecting" in supra note 9 at 106. [hereinafter
Laird].
The final quality directly addresses the confluence of the interests of the ruling/governing
class of a society and the interests of transnational pharmaceutical industry. The government
can be used to give legitimacy and legalize the actions of these industries, removing them from
the scope of inquiry and discussion (see discussion it!fi·a).
18
C.J. Hunter, "Sustainable Bioprospecting: Using Private Contracts and International
Legal Principles and Policies to Conserve Raw Medicinal Materials" (1997) 25 Boston
College Environmental Affairs L. Rev. I 29 at I 62.
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bioresources which are the subject of the contract) 19 and non-monetary
arrangements (such as technology transfer or training of local
personnel). 20 The contract must also provide for a means of enforcing its
prov1s10ns.
Substantively, the contract must operate within the framework of
principles established at international law for bioprospecting contracts.
Contracts must ensure that bioresources are obtained with the informed
consent of the source community. 21 In addition, the contract must
provide for the equitable sharing of profits between the contracting
parties, 22 confidentiality of any infonnation transmitted between the
parties23 and must ensure, to the extent possible, that scientific research
and commercialization of products occurs in the country providing
genetic resources. 24 The Covenant, in particular, elaborates principles
for independent monitors, stating that they must "have no conflict of
interests", " ... professional qualifications and relevant experiences" and
"must practice full infonnation disclosure". 25
iiZ: The debate regardtizg bioprospecting contracts:.fictions and
realities ofthe private contracting regime.
The eager embrace of bioprospecting contracts by transnational
corporations must be viewed with suspicion. The contracting regime is
not a value-neutral medium where "contracts [are] based on mutual
agreement. .. and the creation of a contract [is] the result of a free choice
unhampered by external control ... " 26 The contracting regime can
legitimize potentially coercive relationships with the patina of
objectivity and formal equality while masking the inherent inequalities

Laird, supm note 9 at 111.
Laird, stfJJra note 9 at I 08. See also Posey, stfJJra note 1 at 68.
21 JJ1'odiversily Convelllioll (Art. 15.5), the Cove11a11l(Basic principle I) and model contract
(Art. 3(d)).
22 JJ1'odiversity Co11ve11!1011 (Preamble, Art. I, Art. 8 and Art. 19) and Cove11a11! (Basic
principles I).
23
C0Fe11a!ll (Basic Principles IV) and model contract Art. 9.
24
JJ1'odiversity Co11w11/io11 (Art. 15.6) and the Cow11anl (Basic Principles I and IX).
25 The Covenant (Principles XIV-XVI).
26
For a discussion of the contracting regime see P. Atiyah, A11 f!llroductio11 to the Law o/
Co11!ract, 3d (London: Clarendon Press, 1981) at 4.
19

20
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of the contracting relationship. 27 Bioprospecting agreements are
characterized as the result of fair bargaining and consent between equal
contracting parties, while removing the agreements from public scrutiny
and regulation. In addition, the use of the contracting regime to regulate
bioprospecting uses "the master's tools" 28 (or contracts) with which
transnational corporations are very familiar, instead of creating new
(more equal) relationships between source communities and
transnational corporations. Bilateral bioprospecting contracts also
discourage the development of multilateral agreements, involving
coalitions of countries, which would level the bargaining field. 29
Ultimately, bioprospecting contracts legalize the otherwise unlawful
taking of genetic resources. The following table compares the
rationalizing beliefs underpinning bioprospecting contracts as compared
to the reality of those contracts:

TABLE

UNPACKING THE BIOPROSPECTING CONTRACT: MECHANISM OF
EQUALITY OR COERCION?

Belief

Reality

• Parties can contract as equals and agree
on mutually beneficial terms. Terms can
be flexibly molded to the contingencies
of each commercial situation.

There is inequality of bargaining power
between most entities and transnational
corporations, especially in terms of legal
resources, ability to bargain and enforce
terms, scientific knowledge of the value
of resources and language differences. 30

27
Support for this view can be found in B. Conklin, "A Contract" in R. Devlin, ed.,
Ca11adian Perspectives 011 Legal The01y (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1991)
and I. Ayres, "Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations"
(1991) 104 Harvard L. Rev. 817.
28
U. Franklin, "The Sandbox and the Tools" in Wo111e11 i11 Scholarship: One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back (Proceedings of the Royal Society of Canada: 199) at 37-39.
29
Bioprospecting/Biopiracy, supra note 3.
30
Seeds and Shama!/J; supra note 4 at 960. An example from RAFI recounts how a
bioprospecting contract was to be concluded between Washington University and Peru's
Aguarnna and Huambisa Council (CAH) of indigenous peoples. However, Washington
University refused to provide a Spanish translation of the contract in spite of a "multimillion
dollar project budget." (RAFI Communique: "Biopiracy Update: A Global Pandemic", online:
RAFI <http://www.rafi.ca/web/allpub-one.shtml> (date accessed: October 30, 1999).
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Belief

Reality
• Contracts mask the reality that
bioprospecting will occur regardless of
whether a contract is completed or not,
and if parties do not agree to the
industry's terms, the industry will seek a
more "appropriate" partner. 31

• Contracts allow for clarity and
disclosure in relationships between
communities and corporations. 32

• Contracts clearly
relationship as legal.

establish

• Bioprospecting
contracts
contain
ambiguous and expansive language,
which strip the contract of meaning and
benefit. 33
• Because of the private contractual nature
of relationships, such contracts are not
public domain and are difficult to monitor
by countries or the Convention. 34

the

• There are no defined contractual
standards for bioprospecting contracts;
any standards are likely to be defined by
industry. 35
• Importantly, parties cannot control the
activities of individuals or businesses not
a party to the contract. 36

31
Ibid. In the Washington University contract with Peru, the CAH did not consent to the
contract. Despite this rejection, Washington University researchers unilaterally started
collection of genetic resources and were reportedly looking for a more "appropriate"
indigenous partner. As RAFI states "The de facto definition of a [.. ] partner increasingly
appears not to be based on representation or legitimacy of indigenous organizations; but rather
their malleability to the corporate and research interests of ICBG."
32
Laird, supra note 9 and supra note 18.
33
See Searle, li1/}·a note 40.
34
This lack of disclosure means that exploitative deals are not open to public review and
censure; as a result, widely-accepted norms are not established (Bioprospeclillg/Biopti'acy,
supra note 3).
35 "By and large, the tem1s and conditions under which indigenous peoples might benefit
financially are controlled by No11he111 corporations ... "
supra note 3).
36
Laird, supra note 9.
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Belief

Reality

. Mutually beneficial compensation can be . Royalty payments of 1-3% are "meagre"
arranged through royalties of 1-3% of
sales or a product developed from local
resources. 37

.
.

Compensation can also be provided
through advance payments.

Licensing agreements can allow parties
to retain control over their resources
and prevent commercial exploitation, by
providing for a one-time fee payment. 42

.

Non-monetary benefits accrue to
source communities such as education,
training, technology and exposure.

.

at best compared to the profit and
financial resources of life industry
corporations. 38
Royalties are often not available to the
parties who made the contribution. 39
Language in contracts can be worded to
avoid paying royalties if possible.4o
In practice, advance payments are
generally inadequate in comparison to the
access that the company enjoys. 41
Licensing agreements remove any sense
of responsibility for the resource and
provide inadequate compensation if a
product is developed. 43

. Non-monetary

benefits is a way of
legitimizing the exploitation of cheap
South labour. 44

Laird, supra note 9 at I 14.
RAFI documents a contract agreement between Merck and INBio which provides
unspecified royalties, estimated to be 1-3%. Merck contracted with the Costa Rican Institute
Nacional de Biodiversidad (INBio) to give lNBio a "2 year research budget of $1. I 35 million,
an undisclosed share of royalties on any resulting commercial products, and technical
assistance and training to establish in-house capacity for drug research." (Bioprospeclli1g/
Biopti<1cy, supra note 3). The World Resources Institute has estimated that fair compensation
for Costa Rica's resources would require approximately a 40% royalty rate (Laird, supra note
9 at 111 ).
39
See Sllp!Ll note 6 for a lengthy discussion of methods of resolving this problem.
40
Under the contract between Searle and Washington University and Peru, Searle would
not be obliged to pay royalties if "the biological activity of an active agent was in the public
domain or was known or otherwise available to Searle, as evidence by Searle's written
records, prior to Searle's discove1y of the biological activity of the active agent in a Plant
Extract." Royalties (of a total possible amount of 0.2-1 %) are only payable by Searle if 1) the
final product actually incorporates a plant extract and 2) the final product is for the same
purpose as it was used by Indigenous People. In addition, after payments to intermediaries and
other costs, the maximum possible royalties that the Indigenous People could receive is
0.125% (of a total royalty of 1% ). (Bioprospectli1g/Biopiracy, supra note 3).
41
An example of this is that in the Merck-INBio agreement, Merck provided an advance
payment of$1.135 million to INBio. As RAFI points out, since Costa Rica possesses 5-7% of
global biodiversity, at that rate the biodiversity of the South could be exploited for$ I 0 million
I year. (Bioprospecti11g/Biopiracy, supra note 3).
42
Posey, supra note I at 70. I found no recorded licensing agreements.
43
S19ra note I 8 at 17 I.
44
Bioprospecti11g/BioptiLlcy, StijJ!Ll note 3.
37

38
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iv. The communities providing genetic resources are harmed by
bio_prospecting
Bioprospecting from communities harms the source communities
in many ways. Some of the most common deprivations and damages to
the source community are the following: 45
° Communities providing genetic resources are often coerced by
their governments and international trade agreements into
paying elevated prices for products (because of patent royalty
costs) that exist within their communities.
• The increased dependence on expensive manufactured
products (such as pharmaceuticals) alienates source
communities from traditional healing methods, increasing the
community's dependence on pharmaceutical products.
• Cultural beliefs about what can be possessed and what
constitutes property are violated by legal impositions of
property rights.
The exploitative actions of bioprospecting, processing and
commodification of genetic resources are individually and collectively
called biopiracy.
Although many inf01mal definitions of biopiracy abound, there is
no precise legal definition. 46 Biopiracy has been defined narrowly to
encompass only the theft of plant genetic resources 47 or broadly to
include the taking of biological resources and knowledge. 48 Some
definitions ofbiopiracy include as victims only indigenous peoples, 49 or
Third World or developing communities, 50 while others broadly state
that it can be perpetrated by large corporations against any community
or individual. 51 The means of theft are just as broadly defined; some
45
Generally taken from: Seeds and Slwma11s, supra note 4; E!lc!osures qf the M!i1d:
lnte!!eclttal Monopolies. Prepared for the Community Biodiversity Development and
Conservation Program. (DesignCo, 1998) at 75. [hereinafter El!c!osures]; Biopti·acy/
Bioprospec!ti1g, supra note 3; V. Shiva, Biopiracy: the Plunder o/Na!ure a!ld Knowledge
(Boston: South End Press, 1997) [hereinafter Shiva].
46
J. Odek, "Bio-Piracy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic Resources" ( 1994)
2 J. Intel!. Prop. L. 141 at 145.
4
1 &pranote 18 at 139.
48
E!lclosures, supra note 45 at 5.
49
S1p1v note 18.
50
Shiva, stpra note 45 at 5; stpra note 46 at 145 respectively.
51
stpra note 3.
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assert that it must involve intellectual property rights 52 while others
merely stipulate that goods must be developed and marketed without
adequate compensation. 53
From the definitions in the literature, the basic thread of biopiracy
is an expression by source communities of an entitlement to their
biological genetic resources, 54 which have been stolen and profited from
(using any means, such as intellectual property rights) by a third party
who has little or no entitlement, depriving the source community of
appropriate compensation, other benefits and/or human rights. The
definition of biopiracy must address the exploitation of existing power
imbalances, be they South-North, developing-developed, indigenousnational government or national government-transnational corporation.

2. The international community's (lack ot) response to biopiracy
To date, the theft of biological resources, or biopiracy, has neither
been named nor condemned by the international legal community in
binding legal documents. However, declarations and recommendations,
primarily from indigenous peoples' organizations, have named the
crime, in particular the Ilzdigenous Peoples Earth Charter, 55 the
COICA/UNDP Regional Meeting on Intellectual Property Rights and

52

Ellclos11res, supra note 45.
Supra note 18 and 46.
54
Supra note 18 at 139. This is demonstrated by the specific definition of the term in
relation to the topic under discussion. For example, in Hunter's discussion of the MerckINBio agreement to exchange plant genetic resources, he defines biopiracy as the
"exploitation of indigenous peoples to locate and understand the uses of medicinal plants and
then to develop and market drugs derived from those plants while returning little or no
compensation from sales of the drug to indigenous peoples."
55
Posey, supra note I. World Conference of Indigenous Peoples on Territory,
Environment and Development (25-30 May 1992), expressed by the Indigenous Peoples of
the Americas, Asia, Africa, Australia, Europe and the Pacific at Kari-Oca Villages in Brazil.
Of note is Art. 61:
Indigenous peoples must consent to all projects in our territories. Prior to
consent being obtained the peoples must be fully and entirely involved in
any decisions. They must be given all the information about the project
and its effects. Failure to do so should be considered a crime against the
indigenous peoples. The person or persons who violate this should be tried
in a world tribunal within the control of indigenous peoples set for such a
purpose. This could be similar to the trials held after World War II
[emphasis added] (see also Arts. 70(b), 99, 102).
53
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Biodiversity 56 and the UNDP Consultation on the Protection and
Conservation of Indigenous Knowledge. 57 These documents, and
others, have recommended and elaborated upon measures to prevent the
appropriation of indigenous community resources. 58 Two non-binding
declarations, the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and
Human Rights59 and the Drq/i Declaration on the Rights of.Indigenous

56
Posey, supra note l. Held in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, 28-30 September 1994.
Under "Basic points of agreement" the document states:
8. Prevailing intellectual property systems reflect a conception and
practice that is ... Usurpatory, in that it is essentially a practice of theft ••.
13. The prevailing intellectual property systems must be prevented from
robbing us, through monopoly rights, of resources and knowledge in
order to enrich themselves and build up power opposed to our own.
[emphasis added]
57
Posey, supra note I. Also known as the Sabah Statement, Sabah, East Malaysia, 24-27
Februaiy 1995. In the section entitled "Specific points raised on indigenous knowledge and
intellectual property rights (IPR)" the document states:
Indigenous knowledge and resources are being eroded, exploited or
appropriated by outsiders in the likes of transnational corporations
(TNC' s), institutions, researchers, and scientists who are after the profits
and benefits gained through monopoly control.
The technological method of piracy is too sophisticated for indigenous
peoples to understand, especially when indigenous communities are
unaware of how the system operates and who are behind it. [emphasis
added]
See the Beijing Declaration ofilldigenous Women, which states: "Bioprospecting, which is
nothing but the alienation of our invaluable intellectual and cultural heritage through scientific
collection missions and ethnobotanical research, is another feature of recolonization." Beijing
Declaration(}(l!!digenous Wome!!, NGO Forum, United Nations Fourth World Conference on
Women, Huairou, Beijing, Peoples Republic of China, Aug. 30-Sept 8, 1995, online: <http://
www.web.net/-csc/text/Beijing.htm> (date accessed: November 21, 1999).
58
See the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; Agenda 21; the Charter of
the Indigenous-Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests, Penang, Malaysia, 15 February 1992;
the Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Propetiy Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
June 1993; Recommendations from the Voices of the Earth Congress, Amsterdam,
Netherlands, 10-11November1993; UNDP Consultation on Indigenous Peoples' Knowledge
and Intellectual Property Rights, Regional Consultation on Indigenous Peoples' Knowledge
and Intellectual Prope1iy Rights, held in April 1995 in Suva, Fiji.
59
Online: UNESCO <http://www.unesco.org/ibc/uk/genome/projet/index.htm> (date
accessed: December 1, 1999). For example, the preamble states: "Recognizing that research on
the human genome and the resulting applications open up vast prospect for progress ... but
emphasizing that such research should fully respect human dignity , freedom and human
rights, as well as the prohibition of all forms of discrimination based on genetic
characteristics."
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Peoples, 60 have attempted to address issues integrally related to
biopiracy without naming or confronting the crime, by respectively
recognizing individual and indigenous peoples' rights relating to genetic
resources.
The only binding legal document that has attempted to address
issues of exploitation and biopiracy is the Biodiversity Convention
discussed above. However, opinions are divided as to whether it
promotes or discourages biopiracy. 61 The Convention encourages
equitable sharing of resources, yet provides no mechanism to ensure this
sharing will occur. It contains no binding code of conduct for
bioprospectors, nor does it control access to biological resources. The
Convention encourages mutual agreements and supports intellectual
property rights over technologies, two provisions which aid the life
industry more than source communities. Most importantly, the
Convention does not condemn or even acknowledge prior exploitation
and biopiracy of biological resources.
The lack of official recognition of biopiracy by non-indigenous
peoples is complemented by a strengthening of the mechanisms of
biopiracy through the WTO-Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Prope1ty (TRIPS) agreement which requires "developing" countries to
adopt intellectual property legislation for plant varieties and
microorganisms. 62 As RAFI states: "the effect of this imposition will be
to legalize and facilitate the North's appropriation of resources and
knowledge from the South ... legitimat[ing] the piracy of community
innovations on a global scale."63
60

This document specifies that indigenous peoples are entitled to full ownership and
control of cultural property and that "they have the right to special measures to control,
develop and protect their sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations, including human
and other genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and
flora ... " (Part VI, Art. 29) U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46' 11 Sess., Agenda Item 15, U.N.
Doc. E/CN .4/Sub.2/1 994/2/Add. I ( 1994 ).
61
See Posey, supra note 1 for a discussion of how the Biodiwr.sity Conve11tio11 will limit
biopiracy. See Enclosures, supra note 45 for a discussion of how the BiodiJ;ersily Convention
encourages biopiracy.
62
Online: World Trade Organization <http://www.wto.org/wto/intellec/4-ipstan.htm#5>
(date accessed October 23, 1999). Art. 27(b) of TRIPS states: "However, Members shall
provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective szti ge11eris
system or by any combination thereof."
63
Enclosures, supra note 45 at 8. See also Shiva, supra note 45.
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m. A CAsE=sTUDv oF B10P1RAcv:
THE ACTIONS OF DECODE GENETICS IN ICELAND
Iceland is a northern-European nation; its genetic resources are a
wealth of genetic samples, medical records and publicly available
genealogies which document the genetics of Iceland's homogeneous
population. Its biopirates are a start-up genetic biotechnology company,
deCode, that received a $200 million equity investment from Hoffman
La Roche, a transnational corporation in the life industry. The Icelandic
government concluded a contractual licensing agreement with deCode
which allows unlimited access to Icelanders' genetic resources. It will
be shown that although the names and places may vary, the perpetrators
(corporations), the victims (source communities with valuable genetic
resources), the modes of exploitation and the damage caused by
bioprospecting are disturbingly similar.
The situation of Iceland will also demonstrate how the creation by
governments of bioprospecting contracts, a method that is thought to
remedy or minimize the occurrence of biopiracy, poses no barrier to
biopirates. Instead, the implementation of bioprospecting contracts may
lead to further exploitative situations since, as a "legal" agreement, the
contract is unassailable. The Icelandic situation will illustrate that the
bioprospecting contract, eagerly embraced by industry and treatymakers, changes the fonn but not the substance of biopiracy. It will also
show that vesting control of genetic resources in government is perilous
since government's interests are more in line with corporations than
with those of their people. Iceland will further illustrate that
bioprospecting contracts negotiated between governments and industry
do not guarantee "equitable sharing" 64 of resources; the terms of the
contract are only as good as those negotiated.
Iceland also serves as an exposition of the many fonns of damage
that biopiracy can wreak on the source community. It will be shown that
the Icelandic peoples' human rights to privacy and informed consent,
and rights to adequate compensation have been denied. It will also be
demonstrated that the biopirates have made promises they cannot keep
to the Icelandic people.
64

See Biodiwrsily CollJJelllioll, supra note 10.
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As biopiracy is a specialized type of theft with no precise legal
definition, 65 to demonstrate that the Icelandic situation is biopiracy, I
will show that it fits the elements of traditional theft and the specialized
situation of biopiracy.

The life industry is interested in Iceland:
A former resident of Iceland, Kari Stefansson, established deCode
Genetics (hereinafter deCode) in 1996, as a small start-up biotechnology
company specializing in genetic research. Although the company claims
70% ownership by Icelanders, 66 it is a wholly owned subsidiary of a
Delaware paper corporation and was initially funded by $12 million of
investments from American and European venture capitalists, 67 whose
representatives comprise five of the six members of the Board of
Directors of deCode. 68 In February 1998, deCode accepted a $200
million equity investment from Hoffmann-LaRoche (Roche), a
transnational Swiss-based pharmaceutical company, to enable it to
research the genetic causes of twelve common diseases. 69
DeCode will compile Icelanders' medical records, genealogy and
genetic data in a centralized database to facilitate discovering the genetic
processes that cause disease. As a representative from Roche stated, this
research will help the life industry "make drugs". 70 In addition, the life
65

Whereas theft has a precise legal definition.
This goal was reached in June of 1999 when the original interests sold some of the their
shares to The Icelandic Investment Bank, The National Bank of Iceland, The Agricultural
Bank and Hof Holding Company to vest "approximately" 70% ownership in Icelanders
(Online: deCode <http://www.decode.is> (date accessed: November 2, 1999). Note that the
major shareholders are not individual citizens but banks.
67
These include Advent International, Atlas Venture, Arch Venture Pminers, Falcon
Technologies, Medical Science Partners and Polaris Venture Partners (R.C. Lewontin,
"People are not Commodities", New York Times (January 23, 1999)).
68
Online: deCode <http://www.decode.is/company/index.html> (date accessed:
November 2, 1999).
69
Online: deCode <http://www.decode.is/e_news l_releases.htm> (date accessed:
November 2, 1999). E. Marshall notes: "Roche Holding of Base announced it would pay $200
million over the next five years for research by an obscure finn in Reykjavik called deCode
Genetics, which at the time had no products, no clients, and less than a year's operating
experience." (E. Marshall, "Iceland's Blond Ambition: A Nordic Country Cashes in on its
Isolated Gene Pool", online: Mother Jones <http://truher.mojones.com/motherjones/MJ98/
marshal!. html> (date accessed: November 15, 1999) [hereinafter Marshall]).
70
ibid. Once genetic processes that underlie disease have been identified, pharmaceutical
companies can design drug treatments which anticipate diseases and sell them to patients
before diseases have even occurred.
66
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industry hopes to use deCode's research to aid the development of
"pharmacogenomics", a system whereby the most suitable persons for
clinical trials of drugs are selected by genetic testing. If the drug were
successful in treating their condition, it would be marketed to people
whose genetic profiles matched those of the trial group.
Pharmacogenomics results in huge financial savings for pharmaceutical
compames by reducing the volume of clinical trials that must be
conducted.

2. Why Iceland is of interest to the life industry
Iceland71 is a valuable resource to life industry bioprospectors
because its genetic homogeneity and meticulous historical and
genealogical records allow comprehensive genetic research.
Iceland's present population is largely descended from a small
number of Nordic and Gaelic explorers who settled the island in the
seventh century A.D .. 72 Since that time, most Icelanders have married
and reproduced with the descendants of those original settlers, leading to
a high level of genetic homogeneity among Icelanders. Few people have
emigrated to Iceland due to its harsh enviromnent and living conditions.
The genetic homogeneity of the island has increased due to disease and
natural disasters, 73 which further restricts the genetic variation of
Icelanders. 74
Iceland is an isolated Notihern European nation whose population is about 270 000.
Note that contrary to the assertions of the popular media that Iceland possesses a
genetically homogeneous population descended from the Vikings, the Gaelic po11ion of the
genetic mixture is estimated at greater than 50%. (E. Amason, Letter to the Editor, The New
York Ttilles, online: Mannvernd <http://www.mannvernd.is/english/articles/ea.nytimes.html>
(date accessed: November 15, 1999)) [hereinafter Amason].
73
In the 1400's the Black Death killed two thirds of the population. In addition, the
residents were subject to smallpox and finally in the late l 700's the volcano Hekla erupted.
The volcano spewed ash over pastures and fields, disrupting agriculture and causing a severe
famine. Marshall, supra note 69.
74
Icelanders also enjoy uniformity in their good standard of living, living conditions and
diets. (A. Berger, "Private company wins rights to Icelandic gene database.", online: British
Medical Journal <http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/short/318/7175/l l> (date accessed:
November 12, 1999) [hereinafter Berger]).
Alternate explanations for the attractiveness of the Icelandic population have been
proposed, in particular J.H. Edwards believes:
It is not genetic homogeneity which makes Iceland so attractive for the
study of these disorders. It is the genetic heterogeneity of its individuals,
much enriched by Celtic genes from a few slaves and many women,
71

72
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In addition to the homogeneity of the genetic pool, Icelanders have
kept meticulous records of their genealogy and ancestry; records can be
traced to the seventeenth century and comprehensive records have been
kept since the 1840's. 75 Since 1915, the Icelandic healthcare service has
been collecting detailed medical records and since the Second World
War it has collected tissue samples from Icelandic healthcare users.

3. How the life industry is accessing Icelanders' genetic resources
DeCode's rights to Iceland's genetic inf01mation are created by
legislation passed by the Icelandic parliament in 1998, entitled an Act on
a Health Sector Database (see Appendix A). 76 The objective of the Act
is "to authorise the creation and operation of a centralised database of
non-personally identifiable health data with the aim of increasing
knowledge in order to improve health and health services". 77 The Act
aims to achieve this objective by concluding a bilateral bioprospecting
contract between the government and deCode, without mentioning the
corporate party specifically. The Act legislates with respect to five
essential tenns of the contract: the licensing regime, the access rights,
enforcement provisions, the consent scheme and privacy requirements.
The first three terms are procedural, whereas the consent and privacy
requirements are more substantive.
acquired by both consent and abduction, from the coastal regions of
Ireland and No1ih Britain. It seems likely that there is a majority of Celtic
genes (Bjarnason et al. 1973), although this need not imply a majority of
Celtic settlers. It is this innate variability, coupled with the high regional
homogeneity in physique, culture, diet and other environmental features,
that makes Iceland so attractive for the study of common disorders.
J.H. Edwards, "Decoding genes in Iceland", online: Mannvernd <http://
www .mannvernd.is/english/articles/04. l 2.1998_decoding_genesjohn_edwards.html> (date
accessed: November 12, 1999).
75
These records were input into a computerized database funded by the Atomic Energy
Commission in the U.S. in the sixties, a database that has since been maintained by the
University of Iceland and University Hospital. (Ibid.) This record-keeping has resulted in a
depth of knowledge to the extent that the family ties can be traced of 75% of all Icelanders that
have ever lived. (J. Crosby, "Iceland: The selling of a nation's genetic code", online: Star
Tribune <http://www.startribune.com/cgi-bin/stOnLine/article?thisSlug=ice I O&date= IOFeb- l 999&word=iceland> (date accessed: November 14, 1999)).
76 [hereinafter the Act]. The legislation was passed in October 1998 with 37 for and 20
against, with 6 abstentions. (English version of legislation available online: Mannvernd
<http://www. brunnur.stj r. is/interpro/htr/htr.nsf/pages/gagngr-log-ensk> (date accessed:
October 23, 1999)).
77 Ibid. Art. I .
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i. .Licensing scheme:

The licensing scheme of the Act outlines the compensation terms
of the bioprospecting contract. Article 4 authorizes the government to
issue an exclusive license 78 to create a health sector database; the article
also specifies that the licensee will pay all the costs of the licensing
scheme, in particular the costs of monitoring the creation and use of the
database and the costs of processing information for ent1y onto the
database. The license is temporary (12 years at a time -Art. 5, no. 9) and
cannot be transferred. 79
A condition of the license is that the database must be located
exclusively in Iceland. 80 This is further supported by Article 10, which
provides that the database may not be transported out of Iceland and
database processing must occur in Iceland. However, the legislation
notes significantly that "[t]he licensee is authorised during the period of
the licence to use the data on the database for purposes of financial
profit, under the conditions laid down in this legislation and the
licence." 81
zZ Access rights:
Legislative provisions also govern the supply, use and access to
genetic resources. Article 6 provides that a three-person committee and
the Data Protection Commission 82 will monitor the creation and
operation of the health service database. 83 Article 7 provides that the
actual medical information will be obtained through contracts with
health institutions or self-employed health workers (i.e. doctors).
The licensee is not authorized to grant direct access to data on the
database, however the licensee is entitled to process data in the
database. 84 This information can be used to "develop new or improved

78
A license is defined by B. Ziff as "a permission to do that which would otherwise
constitute a trespass. Such a privilege may be expressly conferred ... or it may be implied." (B.
Ziff, Pni1cip!es qfProperly Law (Scarborough: Carswell, 1996) at 274).
79
Act, supra note 76 Ati. 5.
so Act, Slijl!'O note 76 Art. 5, no. I.
81
Act, SlijJIYl note 76 Ati. I 0 [emphasis added].
82
Act, Slijl!'O note 76 Art. 12.
83
Especially adherence to the conditions of the licence and the legislation.
84
Act, Slijl!'O note 76 Ati. I 0.
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methods of achieving better health, prediction, diagnosis and treatment
of disease." 85
The government will have access to statistical data from the
database 86 free of charge. 87 Article 9 confirms that this infom1ation can
be used for the "making of health reports and planning, policy-making
and other projects". There is no specific provision for access by
independent scientific researchers 88 or individuals.

iiz: Enforcement terms.
The license may be revoked with or without notice if the licensee
violates the terms of the legislation or of the license. The license can also
85 DeCode intends to use its access rights as follows: genetic information is obtained from
individuals with the illnesses deCode hopes to research through collaborating physicians. The
physicians obtain blood samples from these patients, then the patient's identity is replaced
with an encrypted ID. The sample is then sent for testing at deCode's labs where its genetic
profile or genotype is obtained. The genetic profile is then matched with medical records
including "physical details, including a person's disease status, age and weight" and family
genealogical records (Marshall, supra note 69).
86 Act, supra note 76 Art. 5, no. 7.
87
Act, supra note 76 Art. 9.
88 Act, supra note 76 Art. 4 provides that "[t]he minister and licensee may agree on further
payments to the Treasury, which shall be devoted to promoting the health service, research
and development." [emphasis added]
Art. 6 makes a tangential reference to the role of the three person committee m
determining:
[t]he sum to be paid by the licensee under the terms of para. 3 art. 4 shall be
negotiated by the committee, as shall recompense in the form of access to
data from the database for health institutions, self-employed health
workers and their staff for purposes of scientific research. [emphasis
added]
In addition, Art 5. No. 8 provides that:
[t]he licensee shall pay all eosts of processing data from health institutions
and self-employed health workers for entry onto the database. The data
shall be proeessed in a manner that fulfills the needs of the relevant
institution or self-employed health worker for a standardised information
system, the needs of medical specialist fields and the requirements of
health authorities, cp. Clause 7, and so that it can be used in scientific
research. [emphasis added]
The Notes to the Bill do provide that: "the Bill provides that a special committee ... will be
able to grant scientists access to data from the database for use in scientific research; it is one
of the conditions of the license being granted that the needs of scientists shall be taken into
account in processing of data on the database." (Noles lo the Bill, online: Mannvernd <http://
mannvernd.is/english/laws/HSD.bill.html> (date accessed: October 23. 1999) Part III, para.
4.) [hereinafter Notes lo !he B1!1].
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be revoked ifthe licensee becomes unable to operate the database. 89 The
legislation provides in Article 14 for penalties of fines or imprisonment
if the legislation or license is not adhered to. If the licensee violates the
confidentiality/privacy policies then it must pay compensation to the
person affected. 90
iv. Consent scheme:
The supply of genetic resources to deCode does not require the
informed consent of the patients whose data is being supplied. Rather, a
patient must ask to have their data removed from the database. As
stipulated in Article 8:
A patient may request at any time that infonnation on him/her not be
entered onto the health-sector database. The patient's request may
apply to all existing information on him/her or that which may be
recorded in the future, or to some specific information. Such a request
must be complied with. The patient shall inform the Director General
of Public Health of his/her wish ... 91

v. Privacy scheme:
The legislation attempts to protect the privacy rights of Icelanders.
The security standards of the health care database are monitored by the
Data Protection Commission. 92 Health care workers 93 encrypt personal
data prior to its handling by the licensee in order to ensure
confidentiality. This information is encrypted one-way to ensure that the
coding cannot be traced by a de-coding key. 94 The licensee must
develop guidelines for ensuring confidentiality in its processing of data,
must ensure that "data are processed and connected in such a way that
they cannot be linked to identifiable individuals" and cannot allow
access to individual information. 95 All employees of the licensee are

89

Act, supra note 76 Arts. 13 and 15.
Act, supra note 76 Art. 17.
91
Act, supra note 76 Art. 8.
92
Act, sztpm note 76 Art. 5 no. 2 and Art. 12.
93
The Act also provides that the recording and processing of data will be carried out by
individuals professionally qualified in the health sector (Act, s1tpm note 76 Art. 5, no. 3).
94
Act, sztpra note 76 Art. 7.
95
Act, s1tp1v note 76 Art. 10.
90
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strictly bound to a confidentiality agreement, which does not tenninate
when their employment ends. 96
vt: Comparison to generalprinciples governing bioprospecting
contracts.·

The Act legislates the terms of a bioprospecting contract. In
accordance with the spirit of the Biodiversity Convention, the contract is
between government and a corporation. 97 The legislation specifies
supply, access, compensation and enforcement terms; however its
access terms are too vague and do not clearly state that access will be
enjoyed by parties other than the government or deCode. 98 The Act
violates the standard terms for bioprospecting contracts by not providing
for the informed consent of the source community. The Act does
legislate privacy requirements; however, as will be demonstrated, 99
these provisions are far from adequate to protect the source community.
The Act does not provide for the "equitable sharing ofbenefits" 100 of the
contract since deCode keeps all financial profit derived from the
database with no benefits to Icelanders (like royalties) other than the
licensing fee. The Act does adhere to the substantive principles of the
bioprospecting contract by ensuring that the company is based in and the
database is processed in Iceland; however, there is no control over the
processed material once bought by a transnational pharmaceutical
company. The legislation also contains no terms regulating deCode's
potential to obtain intellectual property rights over Icelandic genes.
96

Act, supra note 76 Art. 11.
It must be noted that the BiodiJJersi!y Co11JJe11!io11 does not refer to human genetic
resources. As outlined in Posey, supra note 1 at 171: "Any possibility that the [BiodiJJersily
Co11JJe11!io1J] could be interpreted to include human genes as genetic resources was eliminated
at the Second Conference of the Parties, in November 1995, which decided that "human
genetic resources are not included within the framework of the Convention" (UNEP 1995.
Report of the Second Meeting of the Conference of the Patiies to the Convention on Biological
Diversity (UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19). UNEP, Geneva.) However, the Convention establishes an
international norm for bioprospecting contracts. See K.H. Ching, "Indigenous SelfDetermination in an age of Genetic Patenting: Recognizing an Emerging Human-Rights
Norm" (1997) 66 Fordham L. Rev. 667 [hereinafter Ching] and supra note 18.
98
For a discussion of the uncertainty surrounding access to Icelandic genetic resources see:
Electronic responses, "Exclusive tools for the future", online: British Medical Journal <http:/
/www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/318/7175/1 I> (date accessed November 13, 1999)).
99
!11ji·a section 3.35.
100
See Biodiversity Conventio11, supra note I 0.
97
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Furthermore, the Act does not legislate the percentage ownership of
deCode by Icelanders. Generally, the Act falls short of the international
practice and the articulated norms of a bioprospecting contract.

4. This contracting scheme and the actions of deCode and the
national government constitute biopiracy
However, the agreement between Iceland and deCode is more than
just an unfair contract. It is international theft, an act ofbiopiracy that is
not being condemned by the International or Icelandic community.
Black's law dictionary defines theft as:
The act of stealing. The taking of property without the owner's
consent ... The taking of personal prope1iy belonging to another, from
his possession, or from the possession of some person holding the
same for him, without his consent, with intent to deprive the owner of
the value of the same, and to appropriate it to the use or benefit of the
person taking ... w1

1 . The taking of personal
property belonging to
another from her
possession

2. Without consent

101
102

Biopirates prospect
biological resources (such
as blood and skin cells)
that belong to source
communities.

• deCode has bought
monopoly rights to the
medical records,
genealogy and genetic
samples collected by the
public health service of
Iceland from Icelanders

• Material is taken from
source communities either
without informing the
community or without
ensuring there is informed
consent.

Medical information is
automatically included in
the database without the
informed consent of
patients.

Black's Law Dictionmy, 6'h ed., s.v. "theft".
Infonnation about biopiracy is generally derived from the discussion at page 4.
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3. With intent to deprive the
owner of value of the
same

4. To appropriate it to the
use or benefit of the
person taking.

Source communities do
not receive profits from
resources they have
collected and cultivated
for centuries.
• These communities are
then required to pay
market rates for products
derived from their
resources, which often (as
is the case with drugs) are
not applicable to their
illnesses.
However, they are still
required to maintain the
source locations of these
resources intact for further
extraction
The dependence on
products of the life
industry removes selfreliance and
independence of these
communities.
Privacy rights are violated
since private knowledge is
made public.

Corporations realize the
profits from patent
royalties and selling
access rights to final
products.

• Icelanders' privacy rights
will be violated by the
public health sector
database. 103
• Discoveries obtained
from the health care
database are not
applicable to individual
Icelanders since the
database is "nonpersonal".
There is no realistic
guarantee that there will
be any benefits to
Iceland because of the
project, either in terms of
free drugs or shareholder
returns
The deCode database
will eliminate funding and
resources from locally
held databases which
treat Icelanders for
diseases.

deCode has the potential
to make a huge financial
profit from selling
processed information
from the database.
deCode will also profit
from creating its own
specialized database and
its plans to obtain
patents on genetic
discoveries from the
database, neither of
which is controlled by the
legislation.

I am arguing here that Icelanders will lose the value of their private medical records
which lies in their confidentiality and private nature.
103
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i. .The taking ifpersona/property belonging to another

Like typical bioprospectors, deCode has taken genetic resources
from the source community of Iceland. 104 This requires the
commodification 105 and subsequent acquisition of rights of possession
to Icelanders' genetic resources, achieved through the formally
unassailable legalistic mechanism of acquiring monopoly rights through
a contractual licence. 106 Thus deCode has obtained the right to exclusive
physical possession of Icelandic genetic resources without a physical
104
Ownership of human genetic material is a contested issue in the international arena. The
Conwll!ioll 011 Biological Diversify specifically excludes human genetic materials from its
purview, hence it is not explicitly within the mandate of government to legislate ownership of
human genetic material. The U11iJJersal Dec/ara!io11 011 t!te Huma!l Gellome and /:lt1ma11 Rig!tts
provides no guidance, stating merely in Aiiicle 4 that "[t]he human genome in its natural state
shall not give rise to financial gains." There has been speculation (Ching, supra note 43 at 717)
that ownership of human genetic material could be founded on a claim of self-determination,
thus extending the international right of self-determination beyond its current purview. As
Ching states "The term self-determination has been imbued with the idea of bodily integrity
and could be applied to allow for greater control of the individual over her body." See also G.J.
Simpson, "The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age"
( 1996) 32 Stan. J. Intl' l L. 255 and E. Kolodner, "The Future of the Right to SelfDetermination" (1994) 10 Conn. J. Int' I L. 153. Both advocate expanding the right of selfdetermination.
Intellectual property law in the United States (significant because most transnational
corporations have strong links with the U.S.) provides that genetically engineered
microorganisms, plants, animals, genes and human cell lines are all patentable, or subject to
legal ownership . As RAFI states "biotechnology has advanced so rapidly in recent years that
there is now virtually no life form which does not have ... potential as the subject of patent
application." (E11closures, supra note 45 at page 15 quoting S.I. Hirst, "Biopatents: A Sense of
Order" (1992) 10 Trends in Biotec!t!lology). However (at least in the U.S.) the human source
of genetic material has no presumptive right of ownership and had no prope1iy rights over
removed genetic material, as was held in Moore (supra note 4).
105
See supra note 67 where Lewontin states that the government of Iceland has made "its
entire population into a captive biomedical commodity." See J.P. Berlan, "From agricultural
genetics to the looting of the Icelandic health system'', online: Mannvernd <http://
www.mannvernd.is/english/articles/jpb.looting.html> (date accessed: November 6, 1999) and
J.P. Kahn, "Attention Shoppers: Special Today
Iceland's DNA", online: CNN <http://
www.cnn.com/HEAL TH/bioethics/9902/iceland.dna/template.html> (date accessed:
November 5, 1999) [hereinafter Kahn].
The property discourse is further reflected in commentary on the situation where the
Icelandic health sector database is compared to a commercial fishing ground (Kahn). The
cornmodification of Icelandic medical resources is of great concern to the World Medical
Association (see i!lji·a note 129).
106
It may be held that the licence does not give exclusive possession to deCode; rather the
license allows access to other parties, hence deCode has not taken or does not possess the
Icelandic genome. This argument is supported neither by the legislation nor by prevailing
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taking. 107 Like standard acts of biopiracy, deCode has prospected
genetic resources (both records and physical samples) that have been
cultivated over centuries by the diligence of Icelandic health care
workers and the tax dollars oficelandic citizens. The link to Iceland is so
strong that the collected genetic resources have even been called part of
"Iceland's national identity". 108
ii Without his or her consent

Medical records used by deCode in the commercial development of
the health sector database have not been obtained through informed
consent. 109 The legislation removes the requirement for informed
consent by stipulating that consent to the release of medical records is

commentary. DeCode has the right to process the data for commercial profit and is required to
exclude all other users from direct access to the database, with the exception of limited access
rights retained by the Ministry of Health (see above discussion). The restriction of access has
thus created monopoly rights in deCode Genetics a fact confirmed by Dr. Hartl who states
"once a body for data becomes proprietary, or requires permission for access, that access is
very hard or very time consuming to get." (Dr. Hartl, Letter to B. Andersen, online:
Mannvernd <http://www.mannvernd.is/english/articles/22. l O. l 998_daniel_hartl-e.html>
(date accessed: October 22, 1999) [hereinafter Hartl]). The conferral of monopoly rights is
further supported by Dr. M.G. Mcinnis ("The Assent of a Nation: Genethics and Iceland",
online: Mannvernd <http://www.mannvernd.is/english/articles/> (date accessed: October 30,
1999) at 1 [hereinafter Mcinnis]) and Berger, supra note 74 where the author states: "[m]uch
of the growing opposition to the bill stems from the monopoly it clearly gives to a single
company so that no other biotechnology or pharmaceutical company will have access to the
data." at 1 [emphasis added]. See also Kahn, ibid and B. Andersen, "The only issue is
scientific advances" (online: Mannvernd <http://www.mannvernd.is/english/news/
bogi.in.response.to.wp.html> (date accessed: October 14, 1999)).
107
deCode's CEO is also interested in pirating Iceland's micro-organisms; he intends to
start a second company to study the extremophile bacterium which can be found in Iceland's
hot springs and glaciers. This microbe is useful for chemical and food processing. (C. Loizos,
"The doctor is kin", The Red Herni1g (July 1998), online: Red Herring Magazine <http://
www.redherring.com/mag/issue56/stefansson.html> (date accessed: November 13, 1999)).
108
The connection between the medical information and the Icelandic population is so
strong that one commentator stated: "Comprehensive hereditaiy and health care information
for a whole nation, in a format in which eve1y individual and his/her characteristics can most
likely be identified! Nothing less than Iceland's national identity is at stake!" (B. Palsson & S.
Thorgeirsson, "Decoding Developments in Iceland" (1999) 17:5 Nature Biotechnology 407 at
407) [hereinafter Palsson].
109 A further irregularity (in addition to lack of informed consent) is that the licensee (i.e.
deCode) is "exempt from procedures to which other researchers must comply such as
obtaining permission of the specially appointed independent national Bioethics Committee.
Instead the Minister of Health shall issue rnles for a special interdisciplinary (in-house?)
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implied unless the patient expressly withholds consent. 110 Once the
patient refuses to allow her medical infonnation to be used, information
entered earlier cannot be withdrawn - the refusal is not retroactive. 111
Hence Icelanders can neither expressly consent to the use of their
medical records in the creation of the database, nor can they consent to
the manner in which their genetic information will be used in
research. 112
The lack of informed consent is compounded by the potential for
coercion of consent (or misinformed consent) since the commercial
database was legislated into existence by the government. 113 The
participation of government enhances the legitimacy and may
encourage participation in the database. 114 People might participate
solely because the creation of a database by government implies a public
interest and a corresponding public benefit. 115
The government asserts that the reason for dispensing with
info1med consent is to ensure the quality of the database, since some
people might not consent to allowing their information to be used. 116
ethical committee to evaluate research carried out within the company as well as questions
posed to the database by others. The Bioethics Committee will only be informed afterwards.":
T. Helgason, "Editorial: New Legislation on Health Database Threatens Personal Autonomy
and Freedom of Research" (1999) 99 Acta Psychiatrica Scadinavica 313.
110
Genealogies of Icelanders are public domain and genetic data is obtained from patients
who consent to its use in research.
111
Mcinnis, supra note 106 and B. Andersen "Hijacked Medical Records" The Washti1g!o!l
Pos! (Saturday February 6, 1999) A20.
112
Patients may have ethical concerns about the commercial applications ofresearch based
on their genetic information.
113
Hartl, supra note 106. It is even alleged in Iceland's major newspaper that the passage of
legislation was facilitated by:
a contribution worth as much as half a million US dollars, from deCODE
Genetics ... It is alleged that the Independence Party accepted 20 million IS
krona and the Progressive Party 17.5 million to grease the company's
momentum and especially to help the bill on the centralized health
database clear the Althing [Parliament]. At the passing of the bill into law,
the stocks of deCODE rose to thirty times their original price ...
V. J6hannesson, Morgzmblaoio (November 2, 1999). Online: Mannvernd
<http://www.mannvemd.is/english/articles/> (date accessed: October 22,
1999).
114
J-P Berlan, "From Agricultural Genetics to the Looting of the Icelandic Health System",
online: <http://www.mannvernd.is> (date accessed November 1, 1999). [hereinafter Berlan].
115
Which in this case does not exist see discussion Ii!ft·a section 3.43.
116
Supra note 88.As the Noles 10 !he Bill state: "In the first place, it is possible to create a
database of personally identified or identifiable data, which would be entered on the database
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This possibility of refusal to consent should only increase the need for
informed consent. However, the government believes that
Clearly it would cost great effort, time and money to gain consent from
every individual in a data collection envisaged here. This finance
could otherwise be used to ensure confidentiality and build up the
dispersed database.

The government has consented to abandoning Icelanders' informed
consent in the interests of increasing the value of the database. Only
deCode benefits from the increased value of the database. The inherent
perversion is that the government has placed the commercial interests of
a private corporation over the individual human rights of its citizens. 117
The protection of the right to informed consent is embodied in a
vast number of international agreements and conventions. The most
significant of these are the European Community Directive 95/46 on the
Protection of .Individuals With Regard to the Processing C?l Personal
Data And on the Free Movement ef Such Data, 118 the Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 119 and the
Nuremburg Code. 120 The government of Iceland has received a strongly
with the consent of all the individuals in question ... The disadvantage is that participation
might be less, so that the database would be of less value."
117
Citizens also do not have the rights to know or coITect their records.
118
EC Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data (the Official Journal of the European
Communities, 23 November 1995 No L. 281 at 31 ). It includes the following definition of
"consent" in Article 2(h): "the data subject's consent" shall mean any freely given specific and
informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal
data relating to him being processed."
A1iicle 8 of the Directive then provides that:
1. Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data ...
concerning health or sex life.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where: (a) the data subject has given his
explicit consent to the processing of those data ... [emphasis added].
9
" Supra note 59. Article 5(b) states: "In all cases, the prior, free and informed consent of
the person concerned shall be obtained." The declaration was adopted unanimously by the
General Conference (October 21
November 12, 1996), comprising representatives of
UNESCO's 186 Member States which include Iceland.
120
Tnals (}/ War Crimtiwl btffore the Nuremburg Mt!itmy Tribunals under Co11/rol
CozmCt! Law No. JO, v. 2 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949). The
Code states:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved ... should be so situated to be able
to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any
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worded recommendation from the European Union and European
Economic Area 121 (EEA) Data Protection Commissioners to:
reconsider the project in light of the fundamental principles laid down
in the European Convention on Human Rights, the Council of Europe
Convention I 08 on Data Protection and Recommendation (97)5 on
medical data, and the EC Directive 95/46 on the protection of personal
data.122

However, there are no binding international agreements to which
Iceland is a party that would compel it to require informed consent.
itt: With inten/23 to deprive the owner ifthe value ofthe same

An act of theft or biopiracy must disadvantage its victims.
Icelanders have been deprived of their privacy rights by the
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior
form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge
and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to
enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision ...
Other influential documents that have embodied the requirement for informed consent are:
Conventio11 on Biological Diversify (1992), supra note I 0 Art. 15(5) 5
"Access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed consent
of the Contracting Party providing such resources, unless otherwise
determined by that Party."
• Drq/i Declaration of the Rights q/'Jm:!igenous Peoples (1994), supra
note 60 Arts. 12, 27 and 30.
U.S. Code o/Federal Regulations, Protection of Human Subjects, Title
45, Part 46 (supra note 45).
121
"The EEA Agreement links Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein to the EU Internal
Market through the creation of the European Economic Area in which uniform rules regarding
the four freedoms, competition, state-aid and public procurement apply." (Online: European
Free Trade Association <http://www.efta.int/structure/> (date accessed: November 28,
1999)).
122
Green Group in the European Parliament, News Release "Iceland's Parliament to Vote
on Commercial Exploitation of Genetic Database." (8 December 1998) [hereinafter Green
Group]. Note however that the government believes it has adequately addressed these
concerns. See Note lo the Bill, supra note 88 Part II "European law and international
obligations."
123
I do not specifically address the issue of intent since I believe that it plays a small role in
the debate about the appropriation of the cultural and medical resources of a population. I am
supported in this contention by Whitt who states:
It is important that biocolonialism not be held to turn on intent. Whether or
not a specific practice is biocolonialist depends on the consequences of
agency, not the agent's intent - whether the agents in question are
scientists, corporations or nations.
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bioprospecting contract between deCode and the government. Both the
government 124 and deCode 125 claim that they have adequately addressed
privacy concerns, primarily by encrypting data one-way, creating a
supervisory Data Protection Commission and imposing strict
confidentiality obligations on all employees of health institutions which
will handle personal data.
However, international law-making and policy bodies, scientists
and specialists in the field of data protection believe that the database
will violate Icelanders' privacy rights. Dr. Ross Anderson 126 concluded
that there was a high risk of privacy violations because the database
contains information about genealogy and health, is accessible to large
transient populations of commercial subscribers, will be highly
accessible to government and contains a large volume of infonnation
consolidated in one database. Anderson concluded that:
The measures which are proposed to limit the scope of users'
enquiries, and to provide technical protection in other ways, are not
credible. There is not even enough information about the proposed
use of the database to determine whether effective protection measures
are feasible. 127 [emphasis added]
L.A. Whitt, "Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property and the New Imperial Science" (1998)
23 Oklahoma City University L. Rev. 211 at 213. [hereinafter Imperial SC1e11ce]
124
The government clearly believes that it has fully addressed all privacy concerns. In the
Notes to the Bill, supra note 88, it outlines how it had commissioned a software company, Stiki
ehf., to recommend a highly secure form of encryption. In addition, it has established the Data
Protection Commission, has adopted the EEA definition of personal data and has encrypted
the data one-way. All employees (either of health institutions or deCode) who encrypt and
handle data are subject to strict confidentiality restrictions and any violations of
confidentiality will be penalized. DeCode will only be allowed to transmit information that has
been processed to other companies and the government has limited access to the database to
ensure that "it will not be possible to pick out individuals or small groups." The government
also plans to have the privacy provisions independently reviewed prior to implementation.
(Notes to the Bill, supra note 88 Part Ill no. 2).
125
DeCode states that a master list linking names and personal identifiers will be located at
the company, but will only be accessible to deCode employees with a Data Protection
Commissioner present. (Marshall, supra note 69).
126
Dr. Ross J. Anderson is a world specialist in computer security and personal privacy in
medical information systems at Cambridge University (Online: Ross Anderson <http://
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/> (date accessed: October 30, 1999)). He was hired by the
Icelandic Medical Association to review the data protection provisions of the health sector
database.
127
Ibid. Anderson's contentions were challenged unconvincingly by Hakon Gudbjartson
of deCode Genetics (Online: deCode<http://www.decode.is/> (date accessed: November 28,
1999)).
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Dr. Anderson's concerns about invasion of privacy rights have been
echoed by the European Union and EEA Data Protection
Commissioners (who have implied the database may violate both the
European Convention on Human Rights and Convention far the
Protection o.f .Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing o.f
Personal Data). 128 The World Medical Association 129 has also raised
concerns about privacy violations. Within Iceland, the Icelandic Office
for Human Rights 130 and independent scientists have also raised their
voices in dissent. The scientists are concerned because Iceland has a
relatively small population and families are easily identifiable. 131 The
database will require correlation of family data hence these families
will be easily discerned due to their socially known relationship
patterns. 132
The right to privacy is a fundamental human right. It is enshrined in
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration qjHuman Rights which states:
"[n]o-one should be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy... Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
128

Green Group, supra note 122. The Co11Fention/or t/Je Fro!eclioll o/flldi1:iduals wit/;
Regard lo Automatic Frocess1i1g (}/Personal Data, titfiv note 136.
129
N. Duncan, "World Medical Association Opposes Icelandic Gene Database" ( 1999) 318
British Medical Journal 1096 at 1096. The WMA agrees with the grounds proposed by the
Iceland Medical Association for opposing the database on the following grounds:
1. Invasion of privacy
2. Breach of patient/physician trust
3. Lack of independent review mechanisms
4. Abuse of patient consent
5. Disregarding of established scientific standards
6. Use of medical records as a commodity, and
7. Creation of a centralized database of an entire population.
130
The Icelandic Office for Human Rights: "l. The bill must contain a clause prohibiting
that information, not necessary for the purpose of the health sector database, is included in the
database." (Excerpts from the opinion about the Health Sector Database given to Althing, the
Icelandic Parliament, online: Mannvernd <http://www.mannvernd.is/english/articles/
02. l 2. l 998_office_for_human_rights.html> (date accessed: November 2, 1999)).
131
Palsson, sup1v note 108.
132
J. Edwards, "Decoding Genes in Iceland" (Online: Mannvernd <http://
www.mannvernd.is/english/articles> (date accessed: November 4, 1999)). Professor Edwards
is a biochemistry professor at Oxford University in England. Edwards outlines the
implications of this information. He believes that the database will identify infonnation about
these families, whose total removal of identity would be virtually impossible if the data is to
maintain its coherency, such as "disability, diagnosis and the likelihood of future disease, but
could, and should, include data on infections ... "
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such interferences or attacks." Binding international agreements such as
the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights133 (ICCPR) and
the European Convention far the Protection ef Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms134 contain similar protections. 135 In particular,
the Council of Europe Convention far the Protection oflndividua!s With
Regard to Automatic Processing of Persona! Data 136 states in its
preamble that
Considering that it is desirable to extend the safeguards for everyone's
rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular the right to the
respect for privacy, taking account of the increasing flow across
frontiers of personal data undergoing automatic processing; [emphasis
added]

Source communities are often deprived of any benefits from the
resources they have provided, because the life industry does not create
133

(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Iceland has ratified the ICCPR.
(1950) E.T.S. No. 5. Iceland has ratified the Europea11 Co11ve11!io11. Article 8 states:
I. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
The European Court of Human Rights has consistently interpreted the protections broadly,
while narrowly defining the restrictions. The protections of Article 8 have been expanded to
encompass the acts of private persons (not just government) where it appears that government
should have prohibited those actions. The Data Commissioners have concluded that the court
could order the imposition of data protection laws if data were improperly processed to the
detriment of the data subject (Rolv Ryssdal, Data Froleclio11 a11d Ille Europea11 Co11JJe11/io11 011
134

H11ma11 Rigl!!s it1 Cou11cil ofE11rope Data Protection, Human Rights anti Democratic Ya!ues,

XIII Conference of the Data Commissioners 2-4 October 1991 41-43. (1992)).
135
Other influential international agreements that protect the right to privacy are the
American Convention 011 Human Rights (Signed Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 18,
1978, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23 dee rev. 2.) and
the Amencan Declaration oftile Rigl!!s anti Duties qfMa11 (O.A.S. Res XXX, adopted by the
Ninth Conference of American States, 1948 OEA/Ser/. L./V/I.4 Rev (1965)).
136
(1981) E.T.S No. 108 [emphasis added]. Iceland has ratified this convention.
Arttde J

Object andpwpose

The purpose of this convention is to secure in the territory of each Party for
every individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his
rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy,
with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to him ("data
protection").
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drugs that treat their diseases. In Iceland, the results obtained by deCode
cannot be traced to individual Icelanders (who have funded the
collection of data through their public health-care system 137 ) since doing
so would have reduced the commercial value of the database. The Notes
to the .Bill recount how the government decided to develop a nonpersonally identifiable database (that does not require informed consent)
because it would spend less time and money, as opposed to a personally
identifiable database which could be traced to individuals and provide
them with health infonnation. 138 However, Icelanders are still required
to fund and supply the collection of their medical records, genealogies
and genes.
To facilitate the theft of resources biopirates often make promises.
They have, for example, promised drugs "at cost" to the population that
provided plant resources; 139 they have also promised royalties to source
communities (however, these royalties, if paid, rarely reach the actual
community). 140 DeCode has used the same strategies in Iceland.
Stefansson, the CEO of deCode, has promised that he will only license
genes discovered to drugmakers if they promise to provide drugs
developed from the genes free to Icelanders. 141 However, this is an
"empty" promise; 142 it is not realistic if one compares the bargaining
power of deCode with any transnational pharmaceutical company.
There are other problems. How could one prove that a drug was based
solely on the discovery of one gene? 143 If the drug companies use
genetic infonnation for "pharmacogenomics", then there is no drug
produced, merely a reduction in the number of clinical trials. 144
137

Berlan, supra note 114.
Notes to the Bill, supra note 88: "The advantage [of a personally identifiable database]
is that data can easily be traced to individuals if necessary for health or other reasons ... a nonpersonally identifiable database may be built up ... The disadvantage is that it is not possible
to trace individuals who might be in need of health care." [emphasis added].
139
E11closures, supra note 45.
14
° King, supra note 6 addresses this problem by suggesting various royalty-returning
schemes.
141
W.W. Gibbs, "Natural-born guinea pigs. A start-up discovers genes for tremor and
psoriasis in the DNA of inbred Icelanders", online: Scientific American. Technology and
Business <http://www.sciam.cm/l 998/0298issue/0298techbus3.html> (date accessed:
October 21, 1999) [hereinafter Gui11ea Pigs].
i42 Ibid.
143
This problem has been discussed extensively in Biop1vspec!i11g/Biopiracy, supra note 3.
144
Other considerations are what kind of restrictions will be placed on the provision of
drugs (i.e. will drugs only be provided to people who can prove their information was used in
138
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Stefansson has also "promised" that 70% of shares in deCode will be
owned by Icelanders, hence Icelanders will receive indirect royalties
through share dividends. However, an unspecified proportion of these
shares are owned by both state-run and privately owned commercial
banks and deCode plans to trade shares publicly. 145 If this occurs, there
will be no restriction on ownership of shares; capital gains realized from
increased value in shares will not even be taxed in Iceland. 146
Biopiracy often robs a source community of its self-reliance by
making the community dependent on expensive manufactured products
(such as medicines). In Iceland, the creation of the health sector database
will likely lead to an erosion of high quality research by local scientists
for local problems based on specialized databases due to the diversion of
public funds to maintaining deCode's database. 147
Biopiracy can also affect the identity and harmony of conununities
in disparate and unique ways. For example, as recognized by the
Icelandic Office for Human Rights, 148 Icelanders are at risk of increased
discrimination due to the monopoly over their medical records granted
to deCode. 149 There is also the intangible damage done to Icelander's
the database)? If deCode is not permitted to patent the gene, then how could it control access
and require free drugs from a pharmaceutical company?
145
Palsson, supra note 108. Shares are not currently traded publicly as a search of the
Iceland stock exchange has concluded (Online: Iceland Stock Exchange <http://www.vi.is/
vsm_vthi/owa/disp.bitia?pk=l307> (date accessed: November 18, 1999)) and the New York
Stock Exchange (Online: NYSE <http://www.nyse.com/international/international.html>
(date accessed: November 18, 1999)).
146
The company processing the database does not even have to be an Icelandic legal entity
(Act, supra note 76 Art. 5, no. I; see also in Principal amendments no. 3 Notes to the Bill,
supra note 88). In addition, the Board of Directors who direct the operations of deCode
Genetics are representatives of the venture capital interests and pharmaceutical companies:
Palsson, supra note 108.
147
An example of this is the Cancer Registry, cun-ently funded by the Surgeon General and
the Cancer Society. Thorlacius et al. provide an example of the innovative Icelandic research
conducted based on the Cancer Registry: (1998) 352 The Lancet 1337-39).
148
Supra note 130. In its recommendations for improvements to the Bill, stated: "5. [A]
law prohibiting the discrimination of individuals, families or groups based on health
information is preferable."
149
Kahn, supra note 105. For example the Icelandic population could be shown to be at
high risk for a particular disease due to the presence of a genetic mutation that increases the
risk of acquiring that disease. However, the presence of that genetic mutation does not
necessarily predispose them to that disease, rather it merely indicates that scientists discovered
their paiiicular genetic mutation first. However inferences could easily be drawn that the
population was genetically predisposed to a certain disease and result in discrimination in the
provision of insurance and employment.
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cultural and national identity upon realization that their identity is a
commodity to be traded and exploited. Furthermore, trust between
doctor and patient is eroded when patients know their medical records
can be commercialized without their consent. 150
iv. To appropriate it to the use or benqit o/the person ta/aizg
Bioprospectors profit from the commodities they extract by
obtaining patent (monopoly) rights on the products and processes they
"discover" and develop. Since corporations have monopoly rights, they
are free to provide unique products and profit from those products for
17-25 years without concern for competition. Hence they are able to sell
products at artificially contrived high prices. DeCode has been provided
with monopoly access to medical records, genealogy and genetic data,
acquired through public funds, of a population uniquely suited to genetic
research. DeCode's only substantial cost is the expense of building the
database, which has been funded by Roche. The potential for financial
profit is demonstrated by the dramatic increase in deCode's share values
(from $1 per share at start-up in 1997 to $22 per share in May of
1999 151 ).
DeCode is also creating its own specialized database, called the
Genotypes, Genealogy, Phenotypes and Resources (GGPR)
collection. 152 Access to this database will be sold to the life industry;
thus deCode has effectively created monopoly property rights over
information from the health sector database, since this new database will
not be subject to the licensing agreement. DeCode also plans to patent
any genes that it discovers; 153 the acquisition of monopoly rights over
those genes will lead to future profits.

150
Amason, st1pra note 72. Also the encouragement of "genetic nationalism" within
Iceland and the myth of a "pure Aryan race" to lure investors may also negatively impact the
Icelandic cultural and national identity.
151
Palsson, st1pra note 108.
152
Marshall, supra note 69. Which will be used to "identify families in which specific
diseases occur, trace the inheritance of the disease over several generation, and rapidly
identify the genetic basis of the disease."
153
Gui/lea Pigs, supra note 141.
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ARE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND ""-'-''""L,,.,u.'
OBLIVIOUS TO TIDS CRIME?

Whereas the international community 154 has clearly labeled the
exploitative acts of the life industry as "biopiracy", 155 Icelanders have
not characterized the actions of deCode as such. Nor have they labeled
their government as a collaborator in this piracy. Why has this
characterization not entered the debate, either in the international or
Icelandic community? I believe the answer lies in the powerful
legitimizing and mediating force of the "the law", science and language.

1.
The law provides the necessary validation for the actions of the
government and deCode through the powerful public perception of the
law as just and equitable, a protector of public interest and of the
community. 156 The law is held to express the values of the community
and mediate competing interests to reach a fair resolution. 157 The
commonly held belief that the law will resolve a situation in the best
interests of citizens and their communities has perpetuated this injustice.
The law then provides the perfect vehicle for imposing the will of
the corporation and government on the population of Iceland. The law
mediates and presents the acquisition of proprietary rights by deCode as
the outcome of a fair, rational, just and objective decision-making
process that is in the best interests of the community while obfuscating

154
I am referring here primarily to countries of the South, Indigenous Peoples and those
who write and comment about biopiracy and biotechnology.
155
See Shiva, supra note 45; supra note 46; B. Burrows, "How Do You Spell Patent? P-1R-A-C-Y?" (1994) 4 Boycott Q. 5; E. Bryant, "Corporate Patents or Global Piracy? African
Oppose Privatization of Genetic Innovations" (1994) African Farmer 37.
156 R.A. Belliotti, "The Legacy of Marxist Jurisprudence" in D. Caudill and S. Gold, eds.,
Radical
o/Law: Contempor{//y Chalkllges to iv!ai11strea111 Legal The01y and
Practice (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995) [hereinafter Belliotti]. Belliotti comments,
"Apologists portray a refined legal system as that which holds a community together,
facilitates the progress of civilization and redeems us from the anarchy of a Hobbesian state of
nature.": lbtd at 11.
157
Ibid. at 14: "Law interprets and resolves social conflicts and relationships, mediates the
potentially disruptive tensions in economic substructures and issues authoritative
proclamations which purport to be the product of an objective, neutral, rational process."
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its true effect. 158 This "monopoly on truth" 159 hides the fact that the law
promotes minority interests of the governing class while sacrificing the
interests of the population. 160 Law achieves this distortion by ignoring
and marginalizing dissenting discourse as anti-health and antiprogress.161 The mechanism chosen by the government, the licensing
scheme, is implicitly held to be the best way of mediating the
relationship between deCode and Icelanders because of its adoption as
"the law". The result of this process is best explained by Belliotti, who
states:
The dominant ideology is filtered through a series of legal surrogates,
purified of direct contamination by the ruling class, sanctified as the
outcome of eminently fair procedures, and solidified as part of
society's core commonsense normative beliefs ... citizens further
internalize the decrees of law, and come to accept these judgments as
their own ... and are
less likely to vent the rage necessary

for

social transformation. 162

158
For example, the Notes lo the Bill, supra note 88, outline how the major supervisory
committee of three will consist of one representative of deCode, one representative of the
government and a third member from the health profession. In spite of facial neutrality (i.e.
striking the committee) the committee substantially represents the interests of deCode and
government.
159
R. Devlin, "The Irish Hunger Strike" (1994) 17 Windsor Yearbook o/'Access lo Justice
16.
160
Belliotti, supra note 156.
161
B.A. Arrigo, "Rethinking the Language of Law, Justice, and Community: Postmodern
Feminist Jurisprudence" in supra note 156 at 89. "This juridical imperialism is constituted
through law's claim to truth manifested in its lofty vision of itself - even more striking than
exercising power in concrete effects (judgments) is its ability to disqualify other non-legal
experience or knowledge, or to relegate them to second-class status." For an example of antihealth discourse see: Andersen, supra note 106 quoting deCode's CEO saying "[w]e're not
going to let people die simply because it might be abused [referring to privacy rights]."
The "public health" justification has also been criticized by scientists who believe that the
centralized database will be biased since individuals with serious diseases and from higher
socio-economic classes will refuse consent. Information will not be properly correlated and
corrected due to the volume of information. Therefore biased information will lead to biased
results which may lead to recommendations of unnecessary or harmful treatments. (E.
Amason, "A biased database hurts people'', Lecture at the meeting of Mannvernd, at the
Nordic House in Reykjavik, online: Mannvernd <http://www.mannvernd.is/english/articles/>
(date accessed: November 3, 1999)).
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As a result of the passivizing and manipulative effect of law, Icelanders
do not perceive the acts of the government and deCode as perpetuating
theft. 163
The subversion of justice is aided and abetted by language. The
piracy oflcelanders' genetic resources is not named as theft but rather as
a "public health" initiative. According to Dale Spender:
[D]ifficulty arises when one group holds a monopoly on naming and is
able to enforce its own particular bias on everyone, including those
who do not share its view of the world ... 164

The monopoly on naming is held by the governing class, which
uses the legal system to label1 65 through legislative and governmental
acts. The power of naming highlights the lack of power in those who do
not possess the tools to name. As Patricia Monture has stated: "Not
being in control of the process of naming - that is defining who you are
- serves as one of the most express examples of silencing that I can think
of." 166 The piracy oflcelanders' genetic resources is not named as theft
since those who would brand it as such do not possess the power to
name. Hence it is not perceived of as theft and so the wrong committed
cannot be acknowledged and redressed.
The government of Iceland and deCode have the power to name.
They have called the database a "public health" initiative, 167 while
criticizing those who label it otherwise as thwarting the course of
medical research that will save lives. The government has branded
deCode's rights to the genetic infonnation as a "license" a tenn which
connotes flexibility and accessibility - while providing exclusive rights
163

The class dimension of this analysis is demonstrated by the proximity of deCode to the
government of Iceland. The former president of Iceland is a member of deCode's Board of
Directors (Lewontin, supra note 63, online: <http://www.decode.is> (date accessed: October
23, 1999)). The confluence between the ruling class of Iceland and the corporation deCode
allows conduct which would be considered criminal in a setting not involving corporations to
occur without attaching culpability. (See H.J. Glasbeek, "Why Corporate Deviance is Not
Treated as a Crime the Need to Make Profits a Dirty Word" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L. J.
393).
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M.G. Salter, "The Rule of Power in the Language of Law" (1985) 7 The Liverpool Law
Review 33.
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(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) 351 at 354.
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to a company to develop, operate and profit from the use of the database.
What rights have in fact been retained by the government? Language has
abstracted Icelanders' identity, thus placing it within the province of
"objective" decision-making. 168 By referring to their history as "genetic
data" and their medical history as "health data" the government has
succeeded in mystifying, de-personifying and removing Icelanders'
identity from its social context. Once objectified, the "data" becomes a
resource that can be consumed. 169
The camouflage provided by law and language is further reinforced
by science. Science presents itself as value-free and unencumbered by
politics. Science appears objective, neutral and always progressive; it
never seeks to exploit or dominate, it merely seeks knowledge and
truth. 170 When issues of politics are raised with respect to science they
are classified as "ethical" 171 (or individualistic) and dismissed without
addressing the underlying social and collective (ultimately political)
power dynamic. 172 As can be seen with deCode, violations of rights to
infmmed consent and privacy are "ethical" issues, not evidence of
commercial exploitation or theft, which must be subsumed to the valueneutral and unarguably 'progressive' force of science.
International law, primarily through TRIPS and the Biodiversity
Convention, seeks to reformulate biopiracy in a legal discourse of
contracts and intellectual property rights. Language is used to mask the
exploitative nature of these fo1ms by naming contracts as "mutually
agreed upon terms" and by encouraging "equitable sharing of
benefits" .173 Biopiracy is justified as necessary in the pursuit of neutral,
rational and apolitical scientific goals.

T. Isaac, "The Power of Constitutional Language: The Case Against Using 'Aboriginal
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York: Continuum, 1990) at 47.
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politically, we turn to ethics" ("The Commodification of Life" (1989) 41 Monthly Rev. 26 as
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In particular Whitt refers to "an apolitical ethics of science in which issues of power in
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CAN ICELANDERS DO TO PREVENT THE THEFT OF
COMMUNITY RESOURCES?

Icelanders can use "the master's tools" 174 in this case, the law- to
assert their rights against the theft of their community resources.
Icelanders could arguably make a complaint to the European Free Trade
Association Surveillance Authority, 175 alleging a breach of Iceland's
commitments under the EEA not to grant monopoly rights. 176
Individuals within Iceland could petition the Human Rights Committee
of the ICCPR, alleging a breach of the Article 17 right to privacy;
individuals could also petition the European Court of Human Rights
alleging a breach of their privacy rights under Article 8. 177 In Iceland
itself, physicians could refuse to complete contracts and give
information to deCode, thus thwarting the efforts to create the
database. 178

CONCLUSIONS

The international crime of biopiracy is of late acqumng more
legitimacy as the Biodiversity Convention, and other international legal
instruments, sanction the creation of bioprospecting contracts.
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Franklin, supra note 28.
The Surveillance Authority is established to ensure that member states comply with the
EEA Rules, pursuant to the Agreement between the EFT A States on the Establishment of a
Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (Surveillance and Comt Agreement). The
Authority is entitled to make unannounced inspections, impose fines and periodic penalties. If
there has been an infringement ofEEA rules, the Authority pursuant to a decision of the Court
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<http://wwvv.efta.int/> (date accessed: November 28, 1999)).
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Removing biopiracy from the unregulated regime where exploitation
could at least be discerned and named to the haven of contracts is a
disturbing new trend that signals the increasing legalization and
legitimization of the global theft of bioresources. Once biopiracy
becomes shielded by the legal legitimacy of contracts, the fact that those
contracts may be exploitative and unfair becomes the responsibility of
the contracting parties and not worthy of international sanction. Hence,
transnational life corporations are free to use legally obtained genetic
resources to "fuel" the pharmaceutical research machine.
The Icelandic situation exposes the perils of vesting in government
contractual rights over genetic resources by highlighting that the
interests of government may be more akin to corporations than to those
of their people. As well, the flexibility of contracts allows the
negotiation of any terms the government desires. The comparison of
Iceland's contract with deCode to standard exploitative bioprospecting
agreements underscores the inequity of the contract. Icelanders' rights to
informed consent and privacy of medical records have been violated;
these particular legislative provisions would not withstand the scrutiny
of even the standard bioprospecting contract, which is regarded by many
as defacto piracy. The government of Iceland should have included
contractual provisions which governed intellectual property rights over
deCode's findings. It also ought to have either included royalty
provisions contractually or included a term in the contract which would
guarantee that 70% of deCode's shareholders be Icelandic. If deCode
wanted to promise free drugs to Icelanders then the government should
have captured that promise in the contract. If the government of Iceland
only intended to grant a license, then it should have specified precisely
the type of access to which other parties would be entitled.
The debate over biopiracy should not shift focus from the core
questions concerning the legitimacy of the commodification of
biological resources and the value of the industries which exploit them.
Currently, transnational corporations have only rights and no
obligations. Transnational corporations should be accountable for the
social and economic consequences of their actions. We must act to both
name corporate crimes and demand accountability for the actions of
corporations by using the means we possess and by forging new tools in
the crucible of our indignation.

